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Judicial impartiality 
and the use of criminal law against labour: 
the sentencing of workplace appropriators 
in Northern England, 1840-1880 
Barry Godfrey1 
This article explores the framework of penalties available to magistrates 
for the punishment of workplace embezzlers; and the penalties actually impo-
sed on thousands of factory woollen workers in nineteenth-century Yorkshire. 
That period saw a key shift in the social composition of petty sessions' courts 
which raised issues of judicial impartiality. For example, a first glance, the 
impact of magistrates who were themselves owners of woollen factories on 
conviction rates for embezzlement seems considerable. Approximately eight 
out of every ten accused workers who stood in the dock before them were 
convicted and sentence to a large fine, or one month's imprisonment. This 
article will explain how such high conviction rates were achieved, and the 
part that judicial biases may have played in their production. 
Cet article étudie le cadre juridique des peines frappant le détournement 
de biens sur le lieu de travail, ainsi que les peines effectivement appliquées à 
des milliers d'ouvriers des filatures de laine dans le Yorkshire du 19e siècle. 
Au cours de cette période, une modification déterminante de la composition 
sociale des tribunaux compétents dans ce domaine conduit à s'interroger sur 
leur impartialité. Par exemple, à première vue, l'influence de magistrats pro-
priétaires de filatures sur le taux de condamnation pour ces infrations paraît 
considérable. Environ 80% des ouvriers jugés par eux étaient condamnés à 
une forte amende ou à un mois d'emprisonnement. Cet article explique les 
raisons d'un tel taux de condamnation et le rôle qu'une justice partiale a pu 
tenir dans ces circonstances. 
The late twentieth-century has witnessed a refocusing by criminologists on the issue of judicial bias in the lower courts. Various writers have raised 
concerns that the sentencing of women, the poor, the young, and ethnic minorities in 
Britain is unjustly harsh; and, that in part, this state of affairs has arisen because the 
social and political composition of the magistrates' benches do not match the eco-
nomic, race and other demographic profiles of the communities they judge 2 . Like 
their colleagues, historians have asserted that the application of justice in the petty 
sessions may have been skewed in a way which was critical to the reinforcement of 
1
 Dr. Barry Godfrey is lecturer in the Department of Criminology, Keele University (England). His 
previous publications include: Law, Factory Discipline and Theft. The impact of the Factory on 
workplace appropriation in mid to late Nineteenth Century, Yorkshire, British Journal of Crimino-
logy, 1999, 39, n° 1 and Workplace appropriation and the gendering of Factory «law»: West York-
shire, 1840-1880 in Arnot and Osborne (eds), 1999. He is now researching the incidence, nature and 
prosecution of urban violence in England in the 1880-1930 period. 
2
 See, amongst others, Carlen, Worrall (1987), Carlen (1988), Darbyshire (1997), Dignam, Wynne (1997). 
Crime, Histoire & Sociétés / Crime, History & Societies 1999, vol. 3, n° 2, pp. 57-72 
58 B. GODFREY 
class hierarchies, in particular with reference to work disciplines in capitalist 
society 3. However, systematic biases against offending workers have never been 
demonstrated at petty sessional level in the nineteenth-century, possibly because of 
the unsatisfactory nature of the available record sources 4. In order to present a new 
perspective on the use of sentencing dispositions against labour, this article will use 
the detailed records of the private employer-controlled nineteenth-century agency 5 
which attempted to eradicate illegal workplace appropriation or «theft»6 in the nor-
thern textile districts. By utilizing these sources, this article will be able to offer 
more substantial conclusions concerning the partiality of magistrates in one of the 
largest and most important industrial regions of mid-nineteenth-century England. In 
particular, it will consider the impact that the changing social and occupational com-
position of the West Yorkshire magistracy had on the conviction rates and disposal 
of workplace appropriators in the mid-nineteenth-century. 
There, is of course, a discussion to be had about the role of State agencies in 
«refereeing» private disputes in private arenas e.g. factory workspaces, and the 
public «good» that may or may not accrue when both public and private law enfor-
cement agencies combine in this manner. This is too large (and important) a debate 
to be encompassed within this article. Indeed, the most fruitful approach would be a 
Europe-wide survey both of the existence and operation of factory workers' custo-
mary right to take home workplace materials, and of the responses of the various 
governments and policing agencies involved in curtailing or accommodating those 
real or imagined rights. This kind of investigation would be of benefit not only to 
European social historians, but also help to place into context a significant part of 
English crime history research. For now, however, we must content ourselves with 
a thorough exploration of the English experience. 
I. 
As with most offences, there was a statutorily determined punishment frame-
work for workplace appropriation, which is outlined in Table 1. However, despite 
there being seven acts passed in this period which could have been used for the pro-
secution of workplace embezzlers, the 1777 Worsted Acts 7, as they were known, (17 
3
 See Emsley (1996), p. 121-150, Trainor (1993), Hay (1983), Styles (1983), (Godfrey (1999). 
4
 For example, the usefulness of the only sets of archival data which could reveal judicial biases 
against industrial labour - records of Master and Servant and Factory Acts prosecutions - are limi-
ted since neither national nor local master and servant statistics survive, or ever existed, for much of 
the nineteenth-century. Similarly, Factory Act prosecution records, despite being the subject of a 
considerable amount of study, have not produced a consensus on the partiality of their application. 
See Carson (1970,1979); Bartrip, Fenn (1983); Nardinelli (1985), Bartrip (1985); Peacock (1985). 
5
 The Worsted Committee and their Inspectors were a private, state-funded, detection and prosecution 
agency which was in operation between 1777 and 1965. The Committee kept quantifiable records of 
the prosecutions they launched between 1844 and 1876, as well as considerable qualitative material 
concerning judicial decisions made in those prosecutions. 
6
 Workplace appropriation was the illegal taking home of materials which employees came upon 
during the process of manufacture. 
7
 Worsted was a type of wool used by manufactures in the West Riding of Yorshire, and in parts of 
Cheshire and Lancashire in cloth production. 
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Geo. III c.56) 8 and the Committee responsible for prosecuting the legislation (crea-
ted by 17 Geo.III c.11) were the primary weapons used by the employers 9. The main 
clauses of 17 Geo. III c.56 proscribed the mere possession of woollen or worsted 
Table T. The punishment structure for illegal workplace appropriation, 1777-1875 
goods whose ownership was in dispute, as well as the selling/buying of embezzled 
workplace materials. In order to detect and prosecute infringements of the act a 
Committee of the most powerful worsted manufacturers in Yorkshire, Lancashire 
References to English laws follow the convention of first giving the year of the reign in wich the act 
was passed, followed by the name of the reigning monarch (in the case the act was passed in 1777, 
the seventeenth year of the reign of George the Third). 
Approximately 184 workers per year were prosecuted in petty sessions courts under the Worsted 
Acts between 1844 and 1853, when the Committee was at its most active, whereas only approxima-
tely thirty workers per year were prosecuted under larceny statutes at quarter sessions between 1840 
and 1855, after which the 1855 Criminal Justice Act removed most of even that small number to 
petty sessions jurisdiction. 
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Table 2: Punishments for appropriators dispensed at West Riding quarter sessions, 
totals for 1840-1845 and 1870-1875 1 2 , and at petty sessions, totals for 1844-76 1 3 
However, should one wish to reveal judicial biases, these general patterns of 
punishments may be less useful than an analysis of the sentences imposed on parti-
cular occupational groups. Rag dealers or gatherers, waste dealers or fudders, scrap-
dealers, and pawnbrokers were repeatedly condemned by West Riding magistrates 
for providing an outlet for the sale of embezzled goods, and thereby encouraging the 
crime. Indeed, some justices declared the dealers to be worse than the «thieves» 
themselves, and wished that they could be eradicated or «put down» like animals 1 4. 
Do these comments indicate that waste and scrap dealers received disproportiona-
tely harsh treatment at the hands of magistrates, and if they did, does that mean that 
judicial biases had intervened in the application of justice? 
In order to test this, the occupations of convicted appropriators have been grou-
ped into three categories. As Table 3 reveals, pawnbrokers and dealers did receive 
the heaviest penalties, and, since the table excludes the offences of buying and sel-
ling appropriated goods which attracted severe sentences, the relatively harsh penal-
ties for dealers can only be explained in three possible ways. 
1 0
 Although, in reality the majority of Committee members were drawn from the major worsted produ-
cing regions of Bradford and Halifax. 
1 1
 For an early history of the Worsted Committee see Soderlund (1998) and, for the later period, see 
Godfrey (1999). 
1 2
 Quarter Sessions depositions, 1840-1845,1870-1875, West Yorkshire Archives: Wakefield QS1. 
1 3
 Worsted Committee Registers, 1844-1876 West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford 56D.88/4/3. 
1 4
 See 16 Mar. 1848; 11 Oct. 1849; 1 Dec. 1853; 11 Oct. 1855, Bradford Observer. 
and Cheshire (where the acts applied) 1 0 organized a team of Inspectors who patrol-
led the region, searched suspects' houses, and were called in by factory owners and 
foremen to apprehend workplace offenders1 1. 
The table below (Table 2) portrays the penalties that were imposed on workplace 
appropriators in the West Riding quarter sessions' courts during 1840 to 1880, as 
well as the punishments dispensed at petty sessions (where 95% of workplace 
appropriation cases were heard). 
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Table 3: Sentences for embezzlement/unexplained possession, by occupation, 
West Riding, 1844 -1876 1 5 
First, it is possible that approximately a fifth of the convicted dealers had pre-
vious convictions and consequently received heavier penalties. This is unlikely, 
since convicted pawnbrokers and dealers would have received heavy attention from 
the police, and would have found it difficult to keep trading. An alternative expla-
nation is that the magistrates imposed more severe penalties solely because of the 
occupation of the accused. However, if that was the case, why was the conviction 
rate for pawnbrokers/dealers (65.3%) lower than that of factory employees 
(76.9%)? One reason is that the evidence against factory workers tended to be very 
strong - many employees, for example, were apprehended with appropriated mate-
rial on their person, or hidden in their houses, which were was difficult to explain 
away. Moreover, dealers had more reasons to have unmarked cloth on their pre-
mises, which lessened the impact of circumstantial evidence, and one supposes that 
many could «rustle up» an invoice if one should be needed to prove ownership. The 
third, and most likely explanation, though it cannot be proven, is that those pawn-
brokers who found themselves unable to escape conviction suffered heavier punish-
ments to compensate for those that got away. Although they may not have had the 
chance to punish all the dealers they wished to, magistrates were sure to insist that 
the ones that they could reach received comparatively «stiff» penalties. 
From the figures presented above, it seems that a direct causal link between the 
occupation of the defendant and the severity of their punishment cannot easily be 
established. However, this problem can be examined from other angles. For 
example, the rate of conviction for workplace appropriation, which was higher than 
that for comparable offences. Whereas the conviction rate for all cases prosecuted 
by the Worsted Committee between 1844-76 was 82.4%, the conviction rate for the 
offence of simple larceny at Bradford petty sessions between 1865 and 1870 was 
only 64.0%, and for the larceny of goods valued at less than five shillings it was only 
62.0% 1 6 . From these statistics it is clear that the Worsted Acts had a much greater 
success rate than other comparable acts. Was this due to appropriation cases being 
judged by magistrates who made their money by manufacturing, and was the occu-
pation of the magistrate a predictor of the trial result? 
1 5
 Worsted Committee Registers, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford 56D.88/4/3-4. 
1 6
 Chief Constable of Bradford's Reports, 1865-70, West Yorkshire Archives Bradford, BBC1/1/2. 
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II. 
1 7
 Harewood Estate, Lord Lieutenant's Papers, Box Two, Harewood to Lord Cottenham, Lord 
Chancellor, 3rd December, 1837, West Yorkshire Archives: Leeds. 
1 8
 Harewood to Lord Cottenham, 3 Dec. 1837. Harewood Mss, uncatalogued, West Yorkshire Archives: 
Leeds. 
1 9
 See a summary of J. Styles paper to the Society for the Study of Labour in Styles (1987). 
2 0
 Knipe(1970,p.28). 
2 1
 Foster (1971, appendix 1). For a discussion of the changes to the social composition to the English 
magistracy in this period, see Thompson (1963, p. 110); Swift (1992, p. 77); Philips (1976), Zangerl 
(1981). 
2 2
 Sweeney (1985, p.83). 
2 3
 See Elliot (1982). 
By approximately 1830, under the pressure of rapid population growth and an 
expansion of judicial business, the Lord Lieutenant of Yorkshire had been compelled, 
despite his own grave personal reservations, to appoint men engaged in commerce 
and manufacturing to the Bench 1 7. Knipe suggests that he resisted this administrative 
imperative long into the nineteenth-century not because of his own prejudice against 
merchants and industrialists, but because he feared that manufacturing magistrates 
would not be able to act impartially in cases involving industrial workers 1 8. This pro-
blem had, however, already presented itself, with rural landowning magistrates being 
markedly sympathetic to eighteenth-century cottage workers who had fallen foul of 
early anti-embezzlement laws, as John Styles has noted. Presumably the Lord Chan-
cellor had not known of these problems of partiality, or had decided that the situation 
could only get worse when industrialists became involved in the business of justice 1 9. 
However, despite the Lord Lieutenant's fears that the aristocratic and landed ele-
ments on the county benches would be swamped by industrialists, only 12.5% of 
those eligible to sit on the West Riding Bench came from the manufacturing and 
trade sections of Yorkshire society in the 1840 to 1880 period 2 0. Similarly, in indus-
trialized Lancashire, less than 5% of the county bench were manufacturers at the 
mid-point of the century 2 1. Indeed, even if the manufacturers were disproportiona-
tely likely to convict workplace offenders, their influence could only have been 
slight at quarter sessions. Statistically, in those courts, there was only a one in eight 
likelihood that an appropriation trial would be attended by a manufacturer, and even 
then his influence would be mediated by his fellow justices. However, as previously 
stated, in the worsted-producing districts, appropriation cases were mainly tried at 
the petty sessional divisions. Only if sufficient evidence was available to prove a 
felony had taken place, would employers hazard the quarter sessions. Even then 
they may still have preferred summary justice, since jury trial was unreliable 2 2. 
Approximately six hundred cases initiated by the Worsted Committee were tried at 
petty sessions in either Halifax, Bradford or East Morley (an area stretching nearly 
to Leeds, to Halifax and to Colne, excluding the borough of Bradford, which was 
under a separate jurisdiction from 1847). Those last two courts, which together dealt 
with all of Bradford's minor court cases, had three-hundred and seventy cases 
brought to them by the Worsted Committee in the 1844 to 1876 period. Those cases 
were judged by sets of magistrates who were drawn from similar social back-
grounds. Moreover, they shared trade interests, with 80% of Bradford and East 
Morley's magistrates being millowners 2 3. 
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There exists today a judicial principle that magistrates should not judge a case 
with any motivation other than the execution of justice. Self-interest on behalf of the 
magistrate is, in theory, precluded from the judicial process 2 4. However, the vast 
majority of eighteenth and nineteenth-century statutes did not include clauses which 
prevented those magistrates who had an interest in any particular case from acting 
as judicial arbiters. Those statutes which did attempt to limit conflicts of interest in 
legal cases came mainly in the last quarter of the nineteenth-century. For example, 
the Bradford Observer reported in 1872 that: 
Under the new Trade Union Act, the Bench were disqualified by the clause rela-
ting to jurisdiction, in so much as they were themselves engaged or interested in 
the cotton trade, out of which the dispute arose. The prosecution at Leigh was 
withdrawn as every magistrate in the division was covered by the clause25. 
However, the boundaries of a magistrate's moral and legal jurisdiction were 
established in the main by case law not by statutes. It was ruled in 1851, for 
example, that magistrates who held shares in a company should not try cases invol-
ving that company 2 6; neither should magistrates try cases where they had a direct 
pecuniary interest, however small 2 7. Further, it was held that there was a danger of 
substantial bias» when members of committees, boards or members of prosecution 
associations, acted as JPs in the trials of certain offenders where they might have an 
interest 2 8. 
As these examples show, case law ruled only over very specific circumstances, 
but together these rulings and the reasoning which underlay them collectively esta-
blished a more general code of conduct. This code was summed up in one case 
ruling: «it is highly desirable that justice should be administered by persons who 
cannot be suspected of improper motives»29. Furthermore, magistrates should not 
place themselves in a position where they are interested in promoting one particular 
verdict out of self-interest, «since no man may be a judge in his own case»30. These 
rulings and legal opinions often presumed they defended justice from an individual 
magistrate's greed, envy or prejudice, but they did not preclude magistrates from 
acting collectively from class interest, or with pejorative views shaped by the domi-
nant societal views of the class from which most defendants emerged. 
Judicial principles notwithstanding, there is an historical consensus that justices 
from particular occupational groups had a direct or indirect interest in some of the 
cases they judged. Moreover, it has been asserted that the existence of any such 
interest precluded any hope of a fair trial for the accused. In the East Midlands, for 
example, Chapman asserts that the factory owners used the summary courts simply 
2 4
 The acts which forbade certain magistrates being involved in their administration are listed in Palley, 
(1818, p. 15-19). 
2 5
 20 Sept. 1872, Bradford Observer. 
2 6
 R. v. Gamorganshire JJ, 1857, see The Justice of the Peace, 21, p.773; R. v. Hammond,1863, Justice 
of the Peace, 27, p.793. 
2 7
 Per Blackburn, J., R. v. Rand; R. v. Justices of Bradford, 1866, Justice of the Peace, 30, p.293. 
2 8
 R. v. Henley, 1892, Justice of the Peace, 56, p.391. See 28 & 29 Vict. c l21 . , s. 61 and R. v Allan 4 B 
& S . 9 1 5 . 
2 9
 Per Mellor, J., in R. v. Allan, 1864. 
3 0
 R. v. Hoseason, 1811, 14 east p. 605; see Harris (1969, p. 273-274). 
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as an extension of their private powers 3 1 . Similarly, in the West Midlands, Hay states 
that «the local magistracy and the great manufacturers saw eye to eye»32, and des-
cribed how this close co-operation worked in practice: 
So that lessons would not be lost, the firm could also rely on at least some occa-
sions on the willingness of the bench to order punishment where it would do most 
good: in 1789 a thief they successfully prosecuted was then publicly whipped at 
the factory over a distance of 150 yards at noon hour, before being sent to the 
House of Correction for three months' hard labour33. 
Trainor agreed that in Staffordshire, «although the JPs sometimes dismissed 
cases brought by masters, the magistrates frequently betrayed their own self-inter-
ested bias...and magistrates only showed sympathy to working-class defendants 
when neither industrial discipline nor public order was at risk»34. Did West Riding 
magistrates similarly reinforce the authority of the manufacturers, and did, as Storch 
has suggested 3 5, the West Riding magistrates and police sometimes act together as a 
weapon of the employers? 
III. 
Heaton's assessment of the relationship between the magistrates and the manu-
facturers includes a curious paragraph. He asserts that the Worsted Committee had 
to contend with the 
ignorance, apathy, or actual hostility of the magistrates...Many cases which were 
brought forward by the inspectors were dismissed by magistrates who did not 
know the nature of the Worsted Acts, and the committee was constantly printing 
digests of the law, handbills &c, or sending deputations to explain to these 
benighted justices the wonders of the statutes. But knowledge when it came, did 
not convince the local authorities of the error of their ways. Doubtless they objec-
ted to being taught their duty by an upstart industrial organization36. 
In his monograph, Heaton had previously made a strong case for the potency of 
manufacturing interest in judicial affairs. Clearly, however, there were a number of 
tensions within the «strange alliance» 3 7. Both the Worsted Inspectors and the Fac-
tory Inspectors complained that magistrates, either through ignorance or compli-
city 3 8, were obstructive of prosecution cases brought against employers 3 9. In his 
exasperation one complainant conflated two possible reasons for their truculence. 
3 1
 Chapman (1967). 
3 2
 Hay (1983, p. 48). 
3 3
 Hay (1983, p. 38). 
3 4
 Trainor (1993, p. 142, 170). 
3 5
 Storch (1981,10, p. 93). 
3 6
 Heaton (1965, p. 428). 
3 7
 Heaton (1965, p. 428-431). 
3 8
 Field (1990). 
3 9
 In Factory Act cases, and in prosecutions undertake by the Committee against employers who had 
bought appropriated materials from workers employed by their competitors. 
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The conduct of some of the magistrates is simply abominable», he said, «The 
magistrates either will not or cannot understand the Worsted Acts. I frequently 
find them making mistakes in their interpretation of the clauses. Judging by their 
decisions I should infer that they regard the Worsted Acts as devised and passed 
for the oppression of the poor working man - not for the protection of the manu-
facturers40. 
Occasionally Worsted Inspectors were moved to statements of incredulity and 
incomprehension at the magistrates' decisions: «I beg to state that I never had a bet-
ter case for conviction, and never failed before with such materials and respectable 
witnesses as I should before the court at Otley»41; and at Leeds, a case was dismis-
sed «contrary to all expectations of the Public in the court which consisted of many 
highly respectable manufacturers from Bradford who heard the evidence»42. With 
the majority of failed cases, however, the Inspectors strove to find reasons to explain 
their lack of success, and the ignorance of magistrates was as good a reason as any 4 3 . 
It seems unlikely that, as an Inspector alleged in one case, neither the clerk of the 
court, the defending advocate nor any of the magistrates understood the provisions 
of the Worsted Acts since they had all witnessed so many cases brought under those 
Acts 4 4 . However, this reason was possibly more palatable to the Committee than 
accepting that magistrates opposed the Worsted Acts per se. Nevertheless, some 
magistrates did make statements which revealed a clear understanding of, and 
contempt for, the provisions of the 1777 Acts. It is therefore worthwhile examining 
these statements in order to understand why some magistrates held the Worsted Acts 
to be morally repugnant. 
First, it must be understood that the statements made by magistrates in court, and 
occasionally rehearsed in the Bradford Observer were not part of a coherent attack 
on the Worsted Committee and their works. Nor was there ever a co-ordinated attack 
made on the Worsted Acts by the whole, or by a significant section of the magis-
trates. The focus of the magistrates' criticism was dispersed, and reflected concern 
over the plight of the poor working people, as much as anti-manufacturing rhetoric, 
or a desire to reform the laws regulating workplace appropriation. Occasional state-
ments made by magistrates were unequivocally antagonistic, not least those made 
by Joshua Pollard. This prominent magistrate, ironmaster and coalmine owner 
continued a campaign of scepticism, hostility and distrust against the Worsted 
Inspectors. Having carped at Inspectors' actions, and criticised their investigative 
techniques 4 5, the Bradford Observer reported that: «Previous to the case being gone 
into, Mr Pollard asked the Inspectors if they or the constable had taken the goods to 
the prisoner's house, and that in future he would invariably ask that question»46. 
Pollard's reputation as an enemy of the Committee may have been strong enough to 
deter Inspectors from bringing cases before him. For example, one case which 
Pollard was about to try was withdrawn when the victim accepted an offer of com-
4 0
 Room (1882, p. 8). 
4 1
 Apr. 1873, Worsted Committee Minute Books, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56D.88/1/5. 
4 2
 30 Mar. 1863, Worsted Committee Minute Books, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56D.88/1/5. 
4 3
 It was an excuse also much used in the eighteenth century, see Soderlund (1992, p. 425/427). 
4 4
 2 Jan. 1888, Worsted Committee Minute Book, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56D.88/1/6. 
4 5
 29 Mar. 1844, Worsted Committee Minute Book, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56D.88/1/4. 
4 6
 23 Nov. 1848, Bradford Observer. 
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pensation on the advice of the Worsted Inspector. It is possible that the settlement 
was considered by the Inspector to be preferable to a court case made uncertain by a 
notoriously obstructive magistrate 4 7, and, in fact, the proportion of Pollard's cases 
which were settled before the trial is more than double the average 4 8. Certainly Ins-
pectors feared and resented particular magistrates - one Inspector going so far as to 
refuse to divulge to an obstructive magistrate that he worked for the Worsted Com-
mittee for fear that the prosecution would then fail 4 9. Better by far, for the Inspectors, 
to find magistrates more sympathetic to their cause. Edward Lister, for example, one 
of the eighty manufacturers who judged appropriation cases in West Yorkshire bet-
ween 1840 and 1880, who regularly held summary hearings in an extension of his 
own home 5 0 ; or Mr. Holdsworth, a member of the Worsted Committee, who tried his 
workers inside his own factory5 1. It is little wonder that these men were concerned 
with the control of appropriation, their membership of the Worsted Committee pro-
ved as much. But were such men blinded to justice inside the courthouse by their 
own interests? 
IV. 
There is a strong suggestion that the «strange alliance» between the magistrates 
and the Worsted Committee 5 2 was cemented by an interest in the punishment of 
workplace offenders. Co-operation between the two agencies even reached a stage 
where the magistrates once asked for the Committee's advice before sentencing an 
offender. The accused had already been convicted for the possession of appropriated 
materials, but the magistrates had not enforced the conviction «in wishing the 
opinion of the Committee». The Committee, «Resolved to write to the Magistrates 
that the Committee feel obliged by their courtesy and leave the matter in their hands, 
having the fullest confidence that they will deal with the case with justice to all 
parties»53. 
Alone amongst modern commentators, Firth alleges that the co-operation of the 
magistrates could not be relied upon. He cites Henry Wickham as one who 
constantly thwarted the wishes of the Worsted Committee 5 4, yet Soderlund has tal-
ked of the warm relationship between the Committee and Wickham, who, after all 
convicted approximately eight-hundred appropriators between 1777 and 1781 5 5 . 
The West Riding petty sessions magistrates and the Worsted Committee seem at 
the very least to have recognized a common disciplinary language, even if that lan-
guage was not spoken by all magistrates. But clearly it has not been possible to exa-
4 7
 Dec. 1866, Worsted Committee Minute Book, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56D.88/1/5. 
4 S
 The average proportion was 2.2%, whereas Pollard had 5.7% of his cases settled, Worsted Commit-
tee Registers, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford 56D.88/4/3-4. 
4 9
 10 Dec. 1846, Bradford Observer. 
5 0
 Firth (1990, p. 185-186). 
5 1
 Lower Agbrigg petty sessions 1839 - 1880, West Yorkshire Archives: Wakefield, P7/9. 
5 2
 Heaton, Yorkshire, p. 426. 
5 3
 29 Mar. 1949, Worsted Committee Minute Books, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford, 56D.88/1/4. 
5 4
 Worsted Committee Minute Books, 1777-1786, quoted in Firth, Bradford, p.145. 
5 5
 Wickham averaged 182 convictions per year between 1777 and 1781, see Soderlund, (1992, p. 423-
424). 
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mine the issue of judicial impartiality by use of qualitative data alone. Fortunately, 
the Committee's minute books recorded the names of the petty sessions' magistrates 
who convicted or dismissed appropriators, which has allowed a quantitative analy-
sis of the occupational bias of magistrates to be constructed. 
V. 
The Worsted Acts required two magistrates to sit in judgement, and in 77% of the 
prosecutions brought by the Worsted Committee at least one of the magistrates was 
a manufacturer, while 2 1 % were judged by two manufacturers. In addition, between 
1844 and 1876, 27% of the magistrates who tried appropriation cases were also 
members of the Worsted Committee 5 6. Moreover, in approximately 3% (22 cases) of 
all prosecutions brought by the Worsted Committee, both magistrates were Com-
mittee members, and in most of those cases, both of the magistrates had attended the 
Worsted Committee meeting immediately preceding the trial. Not only did those 
magistrates have an implicit interest in the case as manufacturers, but they had 
already discussed the case with the Worsted Inspector and the victim of the appro-
priation. Indeed the Committee would not have proceeded with the prosecution had 
they not decided that there was a good likelihood of conviction. Unless the potential 
arbiters of the case sat at Committee meetings blindfolded, with their hands over 
their ears, they would have had at the very least a good knowledge of the case before 
it reached the courts. 
Given that a significant proportion of the magistrates who tried appropriation 
cases were manufacturers in the same line of business as the prosecutor, sat on a 
committee which decided whether to prosecute offenders, and had an indirect com-
mercial interest in the outcome of the case, it would seem that the previously des-
cribed legal principles were not adhered to. Indeed, many attempts to complain that 
magistrates had a direct interest in appropriation cases were ignored 5 7. But this 
would only seem to matter if magistrates exerted undue influence over the outcome 
of trials. What evidence is there that this was the case? 
The statistics taken from the Worsted Committee Registers and portrayed in 
Table 4 are somewhat surprising given the previously described remarks of Chap-
man, Hay and Trainor. There was no completely consistent link between abnormally 
high conviction rates and manufacturing magistrates». Conviction rates were 12% 
below average in the small number of cases in which neither of the magistrates was 
a textile manufacturer, and were 5.4% above average when at least one of the two 
adjudicators was such a manufacturer. However, cases in which both magistrates 
were textile masters had only average conviction rates and most surprising of all, 
when both magistrates belonged to the Worsted Committee, the conviction rate was 
only 72.7%. This was slightly (3%) below the conviction rates of summary cases 
involving either Joshua Pollard or William Murgatroyd, two magistrates notoriously 
antagonistic to the Worsted Committee, and 10% below the overall average 5 8. 
5 6
 Proportions of the 1.176 magistrates whose occupation is known, Worsted Committee Registers, 
West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56D.88/4/3-4. 
5 7
 21 Apr. 1864, Bradford Observer. 
5 8
 Ninety-four cases judged, sixty-eight convictions, Worsted Committee Registers, WestYorkshire 
Archives: Bradford 56D.88/4/3-4. 
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Again, no consistent causal link between the occupation of the magistrates and 
the conviction rate of appropriators can therefore be established through statistical 
analysis - the occupation of the magistrate had some impact but is not a clear pre-
dictor of the likelihood of conviction. Did more subtle factors exist which affected 
the statistics? 
Table 4: Conviction rate by combination of magistrates (%), 1844-1876 ; 
There are a number of possible explanations for the apparent lack of occupatio-
nal bias in the magistrates' treatment of appropriators. First, almost all of the magis-
trates in the textile districts may have made assumptions about the characters of fac-
tory employees which lead the majority of magistrates to convict them in large 
proportions 6 0. Worsted Committee members, manufacturers, magistrates and 
employers of all kinds may have shared not only similar views on the nature of 
appropriation, but also informal and formal social networks 6 1. These associations 
obviously could not «bind» elites together into a homogenous whole, whose mem-
bers thought and acted the same way. Trade competition and personal rivalries 
between various magistrates were undoubtedly a factor from time to time. One 
report by an Inspector reveals as much: «The plain fact of the matter was an old 
score or grudge Luccock (the presiding magistrate) has against us which prevented 
him doing us justice. A former case I had against Mewlay Dye Works, in which Luc-
cock had at that time a business interest, appears not to have left his memory»62. 
Nevertheless, generally it can be assumed that magistrates of all occupations 
disapproved of appropriation whoever the victim, and shared with the Worsted 
Committee many of the underlying assumptions concerning the protection of manu-
facturers' property. 
Membership of the Worsted Committee involved more than attending an annual 
dinner, however. Most members attended the quarterly meetings for long periods of 
time, where they discussed the best ways of prosecuting appropriation. Only a 
quarter of the Committee members left voluntarily over a forty year period, with 
5 9
 Conviction rates by occupational status of all magistrates where known, Worsted Committee Regis-
ters, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford 56D.88/4/3-4. 
6 0
 Plint (1851, p. 82-130, 144-158). 
6 1
 For a description of the close relationship between manufacturers in the 1820-30 period see Myatt 
(1980, p. 33). 
6 2
 September, 1868, Worsted Committee Minute Books, West Yorkshire Archives: Bradford. 56.88/1/5. 
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16% dying, and 59% attending regularly from 1840 to 1880 6 3. Committee members 
were dedicated and diligent men who willingly gave up their time and energy to pro-
secute appropriation. Why then did they convict a lower than average proportion of 
appropriators? 
Either the Committee JPs were cautious in their judgements, and showed 
leniency to defendents, since they anticipated and indeed experienced bitter criti-
cism from prominent sections of West Riding society, or there may have been 
mechanisms which acted to pre-select the cases that were heard before particular 
magistrates. If the weakest prosecution cases were arranged to be judged by Worsted 
Committee members, then the rate of conviction may not have been relatively low, 
but relatively high. This would only be possible if petty sessions could be managed 
in this way, which seems unlikely since any magistrate who cared to turn up could 
sit in on a case. Nevertheless, when sessions were held in magistrates' houses, or in 
at least one instance inside a magistrate's factory 6 4, it may not have been impossible. 
Fortunately, there are more likely explanations than envisaging the scenario of 
Worsted Committee members separating the wheat from the chaff before quickly 
dragging the weakest cases over to sessions to be judged before another magistrate 
turned up. Only 5% of workplace appropriation cases were judged by two Worsted 
Committee members sitting together in a summary hearing. It may be that Worsted 
Committee members strove to avoid such situations lest they be accused of bias 
against working people. When this situation was unavoidable, perhaps because only 
two eligible magistrates turned up to sessions that day, and they both belonged to the 
Worsted Committee, they probably took great pains to apply the law in a transpa-
rently fair way. Indeed, two Worsted Committee members, sitting together, may 
have demonstrated more leniency, whenever that was possible, than other combina-
tions of magistrates were inclined to do. 
If the relatively low conviction rates, in cases when two Worsted Committee 
magistrates presided, is puzzling, the generally high conviction rates in workplace 
appropriation cases is easier to explain. The editor of the Bradford Observer stated, 
in 1853, «There can be no doubt that the provisions of the Worsted Acts are excee-
dingly harsh and oppressive, and that for a very venial fault, and sometimes for no 
fault at all, men have been subjected to its severe discipline» 6 5. In other words, the 
framing of the Worsted Acts ensured a high conviction rate. For example, the 
conviction rate for the offence of simple larceny at Bradfrord petty sessions between 
1865 and 1870 was 64.0%, while for the larceny of goods valued at less than five 
shillings it was 62.0% 6 6 . Both rates, for comparable offences to workplace theft, 
were relatively low compared to Worsted Act cases. However, in those cases, the 
prosecution had to establish two relationships - the one between the stolen goods 
and the accused; and the link between the goods found in the possession of the accu-
sed and the their rightful owner. If both of those links could be established, then any 
reasonable doubt that the accused had not unlawfully taken and carried away the 
6 3
 Figures for the period 1840-1880, Worsted Committee Minute Book, West Yorkshire Archives: Brad-
ford 56D.88/1/3-6. 
6 4
 An «embezzlement» case was held at Holdsworth's works in January 1860, for example. See Wake-
field Petty Sessions West Yorkshire Archives: Wakefield P7/2. 
6 5
 3 Feb. 1853, Bradford Observer. 
6 6
 Chief Constable of Bradford's Annual Reports, 1865-1870, West Yorkshire Archives: Wakefield, 
BBC1/1/2. 
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goods was dispelled, and the case was proved. However, since the origin of more 
anonymous goods, such as woollen waste or finished cloth, were more difficult to 
determine, and the relationship between rightful owner and the goods found with the 
accused more tenous, the Worsted Acts were framed ratherdifferently. The prosecu-
tion in Worsted Act cases had merely toestablish that the accused could not prove 
that goods found in his/her possession were not taken from their place of work for 
the case to be proved. With that in mind, only magistrates who determinely set their 
face against a prosecution could make a case fail. Moreover, to avoid a successful 
appeal by the Worsted Committee against the decision, those magistrates had to find 
some evidential reason to justify their doubting the prosecution's case. Since only a 
few magistrates were interested in seeking out this doubt, most cases were decided 
in the Committee's favour, with no need to act upon any biased judgements the 
magistrate may have held. 
VI. 
The issue of judicial partiality is a slippery one. The qualitative and quantitative 
analysis produced in this article suggests in the strongest terms that manufacturing 
magistrates were keen to convict offending workpeople. Yet the laws against work-
place appropriation were 
tightly framed, and the criteria for conviction were easily met compared to other 
property offences. These factors are, in themselves, sufficient to cast doubt on over-
dramatic assertions of judicial bias. Nevertheless, on this, possibly the richest and 
most full evidence which will ever be available on this issue, the balance of proof 
lies against the nineteenth-century West Riding industrial magistrates. 
Barry S. Godfrey 
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